The ethical dimension in the philosophy of justice of John Rawls and its impact on contemporary liberal policies

Abstract

This research aims to analyze the moral dimension in John Rawls’s philosophy of justice and examine its influence on contemporary liberal policies. It traces the philosophical roots of his theory within the framework of social contract thought—particularly Locke, Rousseau, and Kant—and highlights Rawls’s attempt to overcome their limitations by constructing a new ethical conception of justice as fairness.  The theory is built upon two central concepts: the “original position” and the “veil of ignorance,” both embodying a profound moral commitment to neutrality and fairness in the selection of justice principles.
 Rawls articulates two key principles: the equal liberty principle and the difference principle.
 The first guarantees basic equal freedoms, while the second allows socio-economic inequalities only if they benefit the least advantaged. The research explores how these principles contribute to Rawls’s ideal vision of a just society—based on voluntary cooperation and mutual respect—offering more than a procedural account of justice by embedding strong ethical commitments. It further investigates the influence of Rawlsian principles on liberal social and economic policies, including redistribution, welfare, education, and healthcare, noting how liberal states attempt to balance freedom and equality in light of Rawls’s framework.  Additionally, the study engages with major critiques of Rawls’s theory, especially from communitarian, feminist, and internal liberal perspectives, and assesses the ethical challenges in applying his ideas within dynamic social, economic, and cultural contexts.  The research concludes that despite these challenges, Rawls’s theory remains a morally rich and flexible framework for understanding and promoting justice in modern liberal democracies.